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In a partially reformed economy, distortions beget distortions. Segments of the economy
which are freed from centralized control respond to the rent seeking opportunities implicit in the
remaining distortions of the economy. The battle to capture, and then protect, these rents leads to
the creation of new distortions, even as the reform process tries to move forward. In this paper I
illustrate this idea with a study of the People's Republic of China. Under the plan, prices were
skewed so as to concentrate profits, and hence revenue, in industry. As control over factor
allocations was loosened, local governments throughout the economy sought to capture these rents
by developing high margin industries. Continued reform, and growing interregional competition
between duplicative industries, threatened the profitability of these industrial structures, leading local
governments to impose a variety of interregional barriers to trade. Thus, the reform process led to
the fragmentation of the domestic market and the distortion of regional production away from
patterns of comparative advantage.
"Sages say the path [to salvation]
is narrow and difficult to tread,
narrow as the edge of a razor."**
Alwyn Young





(* *)From the Katha-Upanishad, as translated by Mascaro [1965]. A similar message appears in the New
Testament: "Enter ye in at the strait gate: for wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that leadeth to
destruction, and many there by which go in thereat: Because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which
leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it." Matthew 7: 13-14.I. Introduction
Analyses of the transition to market in centrally planned economies have identified two
potential pitfalls in the process of incremental economic reform. First, the removal of govern-
ment mandated controls in one part of the economy, in the context of continued distortions else-
where, can, for standard second best reasons, lead to a fall in output [Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishny 1992]. Second, political opposition may develop along the path of reform, stalling the
reform process or reversing it altogether [Dewatripont and Roland 1995, Martinelli and Tommasi
1994]. In this paper I use the reform experience of the People's Republic of China to highlight a
third potential pitfall. Incremental reform releases segments of the economy from centralized
control, while maintaining, for a prolonged period, many of the distortions of the central plan.
The freed segments of the economy find it profitable to exploit the rent seeking opportunities
implicit in the remaining distortions of the economy. Their attempts to capture, and then protect,
these rents leads to the creation of new distortions. In this sense, the reform process can be
derailed; while some distortions are eliminated, moving the 'train" of the economy to market,
others are added, drawing it off on unexpected tangents.
As early as 1986, the government of Zhejiang province began to restrict the sale of silk
cocoons to other parts of China. Each harvest season the government bureaucracy, from the pro-
vincial level all the way down to village units, and including police and militia forces, was mobi-
lized to ensure that Zhejiang's silk farmers sold their silk cocoons locally, for local processing or
direct export. Under the plan, the prices of raw materials such as silk were kept artificially low
while the prices of final goods, such as silk fabric, were kept high. During the 1980s, with the
relaxation of central controls on rural industry, locally controlled silk processing industries
developed rapidly in Zhejiang, a traditional producer of silk cocoons, to capture the rents implied
by the artificial price wedge. The trade embargos of the mid l9SOs onwards appeared as other
provinces tried to purchase silk cocoons, at above planned procurement prices, directly from
1Zhejiang farmers, bidding away the rents the Zhejiang government could acquire from localpro-
cessing or direct export.1 In the first half of 1988 silk factories in Shanghai, located next door to
Zhejiang and Jiangsu, the principal domestic producers of silk, received only 40 tonnes of their
planned allocation of 2000 tonnes of raw silk. In a country which, all by itself, accounted for
60% of world production and 90% of world exports of raw silk, Shanghai found itself in thesur-
prising position of using valuable foreign exchange to import silk for its factories.2
The "silkworm cocoon war' described above was just one of themany interregional trade
conflicts, in both raw materials and finished manufactured goods, which appeared in the People's
Republic during the 1980s and 1990s. While a full description of the factors behind this interre-
gional conflict will be given further below, it is worth outlining the main features of the argu-
ment at this stage. Under the central plan raw material prices were kept low and final goods
prices high, generating substantial surpluses in manufacturing and processing industries, which
funded the government budget. As central controls over factor and material allocations were
relaxed, local governments throughout the country moved to develop manufacturing industries
and restrict the outward movement of raw materials, in an attempt to capture the rents implicit in
centrally mandated price wedges. Growing overcapacity in a number of industries, combined
with the elimination of central controls over prices and the growth of interregional free market-
ing, threatened industrial profit margins and led to burgeoning trade conflicts as local govern-
ments tried to control prices and limit "foreign" competition using a variety of administrative and
physical barriers to interregional trade. Having developed financial and political interests in a
particular industrial and price structure, local governments continued to defend those interests,
even after the original motivating factors (i.e. centrally mandated distortions) had largely disap-
peared. The removal of these new distortions posed an additional challenge to reformers intent
1. See Chen [1994], preface pp. 1-2 and text pp. 7-8.
2. Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter, FEER), "In a spin" (23 March 1989).
2upon moving the economy toward free market institutions.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section II below, "Stories," develops a fuller description
of how incremental reforms in the People's Republic devolved power to local governments and
led to the development of competitive local industrial policies and interregional barriers to trade.
Section HI, "Data", leavens the argument with data on the interregional dispersion of output and
prices. I show that there was widespread convergence in the structure of output during the
reform period, as the different provinces duplicated each other's industries. Regarding prices, I
observe a divergence in regional prices in the late 1980s, followed by fluctuating rounds of con-
vergence and divergence (without overall trend) during the 1990s. These data are supportive of
the anecdotal narrative. They are, however, also consistent with a variety of other explanations.
One might argue, for example, that the data on production are explained by the opening of China
to the world economy which, given similarities in factor endowments, has led the different
regions to find their comparative advantage in a common industrial structure, To put this and
other alternative explanations to rest, Section III also presents data on the variance of regional
labour allocations and labour productivities, showing that these diverged substantially during the
reform period. The combination of converging outputs and diverging factor intensities is grossly
inconsistent with appeals to free market mechanisms and comparative advantage, but is, again,
compatible with the possibility of growing interregional barriers to trade.
To establish the argument that the reform process led to the creation of new distortions,
one needs, ultimately, to provide direct evidence of increasingly irrational factor allocations. To
this end, Section III draws, as its final piece of evidence, on data on factor allocations and yields
in agriculture. I show that while labour intensity (labour per hectare) and yields (grain tons per
hectare) were positively correlated under the plan, this relation completely disappeared during
the reform period, as the provinces with the highest agricultural yields shed labour. Focusing on
a more precise measure of agricultural comparative advantage, the quality of the weather, I show
3that during the reform period provinces with good weather increasingly applied less labour, fer-
tilizer, irrigation and power resources to agricultural cultivation. These results are consistent
with a movement toward regional autarky. Section IV concludes thepaper, while an Appendix
details the statistical sources used in each part of the analysis.3
3. This is not the first paper on interregional trade conflict in the People's Republic, which
has received a great deal of attention in the Chinese media and scholarly journals (see the cita-
tions in Section II below, as well as the translated articles in Chinese Economic Studies, Fall
1993). A World Bank study led by Kumar [1994a,b] represents the best attempt to move beyond
anecdotes and present statistical evidence of aggregate effects. Kumar compared the degree of
industrial dispersion in China, the United States and the European Community, breaking each
political unit into 12 regions, and found that China's production structure was substantially more
diversified. It is difficult to evaluate this comparison, however, given differences in stages of
development an.d the size of the economic units involved. Kumar also used data provided by the
State Statistical Bureau to examine trends in interprovincial retail purchases, finding evidence of
a decline in interprovincial trade. However, unbeknownst to the World Bank mission, the data
provided by the SSB (aside from containing numerous errors and mixed data types) included the
value of interprovincial trade transactions with non-state commercial departments in the value of
intraprovincial purchases (i.e. excluded them from the measure of interprovincial trade). This
makes interpretation of the declining 'trade ratio" problematic. In an appendix, available from
the author, I provide a more complete discussion of the statistical definitions underlying these
data on commercial transactions.
Other statistical studies of this issue have been of lesser quality. For example, a team from
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences [1993] presents a variety of data on the interprovincial
trade of six provinces. The tables in the paper are mutually contradictory and the article con-
cludes, at different points, that for most of these provinces the relative role of interprovincial
trade was both rising and falling (during the same time period).
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II. Stories
Any review of the reform period must, perforce, take as its starting point the legacies of 30
years of central planning. Three aspects of the planning system, in particular, had a profound
influence on the development of local policy during the 1980s.4 First, as shown in Table I, reve-
nue collection under the plan was concentrated in the industrial sector which, by the mid-1960s,
accounted for three quarters of the consolidated budgetary revenue of the central and local
governments.5 With the prices of raw materials kept artificially low relative to the prices of final
industrial goods, industrial processing enterprises reaped unusually high returns, which were
then handed over to the government, either in the form of turnover (indirect) taxes or through the
direct remittance of profits. Wong [1992] explains that this system was patterned after the Soviet
model of the l920s, in which "price scissors' generated large industrial surpluses which could
then be used to fund the development of industry. In the context of government control of most
economic sectors, this motivation is peculiar. Presumably, profits could just as easily have been
concentrated in raw material sectors such as agriculture or final sales sectors such as commerce,
4. Public administration in the People's Republic is formally divided into five levels: (1)
central government; (2) provinces, including provincial-level cities; (3) prefectures, including
prefectural-level cities; (4) counties, including county-level cities; and (5) townships [Wong et al
1995, p. 82]. The levels of subnational government have evolved over time, e.g. the townships
were established in 1983 to replace the old communes, while by the mid-l990s villages, although
having no independent budgetary status, had developed their own systems of revenue and expen-
diture [Wong 1997, pp. 190-199]. There is also substantial regional variation in administrative
relations, e.g. in Jiangsu the provincial government bypasses the prefectural level and signs
revenue contracts directly with the counties [Wong et al 1995, p. 99], while in other regions
cities have taken over the direct administration of neighbouring counties [Unger 1987, p. 37].
Given these difficulties, in the discussion which follows I eschew any attempt to tease out subtle
distinctions between levels of government. Instead, I follow the standard PRC practice of using
the term "local" to encompass all levels of government at the provincial level and below and
focus on the overall process by which power was devolved into the hands of these sub-national
levels of government.
5. As the Chinese definition of revenue has evolved over time, I adjust the official data to
construct a consistent series. This, and issues such as extra-budgetary and off-budget finance,
which are not included in the Table, are discussed in the Appendix.
5and then used to finance the development of industry.6 It could be the case that these rents and
price wedges simply represented the combination of ideological bias (e.g. frivolous consumer
goods such as watches and fans should be expensive while valuable raw materials such as coal
should be available to all at low cost; industry is important and hence industry, and not agricul-
ture or commerce, should generate revenue) and practical expediency (e.g., it is easier to collect
the revenues of a few silk processing centres than to tax the incomes of thousands of silk
growing collectives). For whatever reason, industry was paramount as a source of revenue. Dur-
ing the reform period, with the rise of raw material prices and the introduction of contracting/in-
centive profit retention systems, the role of industry in revenue collection declined.
Nevertheless, the sector still accounted for almost half of all budgetary revenue in 1995.
Second, as shown in Figure I, historically most of government revenue was nominally "lo-
cal revenue", collected by local government authorities and then handed over to the central gov-
ernment. In the mid-1970s, just prior to the reforms, local revenue amounted to almost seven
times central revenue. As the Figure shows, during the l980s the ratio of local to central revenue
collection declined rapidly as the central government increased its share of revenue collection.
These figures, however, conceal the fact that, with the exception of some centrally-controlled
enterprises, most of so-called 'central" revenue has actually always been collected by local
authorities, simply because the central government has never possessed a nationwide tax bureau-
cracy.7 Thus, under the plan, and even during the reform period, most revenue was collected by
6. For example, the large turnover taxes, which were included in the factory sales price of
manufactures and therefore collected from industry, could just as easily have been levied after
goods were shipped to distributors, and hence been collected from the commercial sector.
7. Wong [l991a]. In 1989 China's State Tax Administration had a total staff of 450 per-
sons in Beijing and another 150 persons nationwide. The remaining half a million tax collection
officials were appointed by local governments. In 1994 separate central tax bureaus were
established, with some fanfare, in the various provinces. Early foreign press reports, however,
indicated that these new bureaus possessed "two name plates but one staff," i.e. were still part of
the local bureaucracy. See FEER, "Fiscal feudalism" (6 April 1989) and "The Grip Slips" (May
111995).
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local governments, designated as "local' or "central", and then transferred from local coffers to
central coffers and, frequently, back again. The obfuscation inherent in the bilateral transfers of
this system should not blind one, however, to the crucial fact that it was local governments, and
not the central government, that had the long standing fiscal ties with enterprises throughout the
economy.
A third legacy of the pre-reform era wastheduplication of industries across provinces and
the active involvement of provincial and local authorities in economic planning. Enjoying, by
the mid-1960s, hostile relations with its neighbours in almost every direction, the People's
Republic began a conscious attempt to develop duplicate sets of industries in each region and
province, so as to be better able to sustain economic activity in the event of a foreign invasion.
This policy extended beyond the duplication of key military industries to a general programme of
promoting local self-sufficiency in most areas of industrial production. Pressed by the complex-
ity of directing the growing number of small local enterprises, and probably dislocated by the
political events of the time, the central planning apparatus during the Cultural Revolution
(1966-1976) increasingly relinquished control of detailed planning to provincial authorities,
focusing, instead, on managing the interprovincial transfer of key materials and products.8 With
material supplies only ensured when one actually produced them oneself, and with the central
regime actively encouraging and funding the local development of industries, each province,
8. See Naughton [1991] and Wong [1985, 1991b]. The description above sounds more
coherent than the system actually was. For example, almost all enterprises were decentralized to
local control but, when their management proved too complex for provincial authorities, put
under the planning of central ministries (while remaining locally "controlled" enterprises). At
the same time, the staff of the central planning agencies (material supply, statistics, etc.) was liq-
uidated, falling to a total of 610 employees in 1970. In the words of no less an expert than Per-
kins [1988]: "By some mechanism, inputs and outputs and their allocation between enterprises
were coordinated in a way that avoided the chaos of the Great Leap Forward, and this
coordination was in no sense achieved through a revived market mechanism...Tt is not clear just
who in the bureaucracy did much of the planning and control of enterprises, but planning and
control through the bureaucracy did take place."
7county, city and locality tried to develop its own duplicate set of industries.9 It is important to
note, however, that despite the widespread industrial diversification, central controls over entry
into high margin industrial sectors were maintained [Wong 1988] and, consequently, industrial
rents remained concentrated in a few select regions. Thus, in 1981, Shanghai, with its important
processing industries, earned budgetary revenues equal to 10 times total expenditures and, while
producing only 7% of GDP, accounted for 45% of the total net local to centre transfer of budget-
ary funds in the economy.1°
With this background in mind, I now turn to a review of developments during the reform
period. From almost the very beginning, the central government sought to improve the effi-
ciency of industrial production and public administration by hardening the budget constraints of
both state enterprises and local governments. Beginning in 1979, the historical system of full
remission of enterprise surpluses (and central coverage of losses) was replaced with contracts
specifying the division of profits between the government and enterprises, with incentives for
exceeding historical values. Unfortunately, each enterprise, in each locality, operated under
unique historical circumstances. Some enterprises had unusually large or small capital stocks,
others produced goods where profits were high or low because of distortions in state prices,
whereas still others were engaged in the difficult production of goods in unusual locations (as
mandated by the pre-reform policy of industrial diversification). Consequently, contracts had to
be negotiated on an enterprise by enterprise basis, with opportunities for renegotation and
9. Wong [1985] recounts how in Huangshi city (Hubei) there were four iron and steel
mills: one setup by and beholden to the central government, one established by the provincial
authorities to meet their needs, one setup (near the other two mills) by the municipal government
to meet its requirements, and one established by the suburban county, which, needing only 3000
tons of pig iron a year, could not get its requirements satisfied by allocations from other produc-
ers.
10. I calculate Shanghai's net transfer as the difference between its revenues and expendi-
tures since the provinces are not supposed to engage in debt finance and, with the exception of
the rollover of small surpluses and deficits, appear to maintain budget balance on an annual
basis. Estimated from China's Public Finance Statistics 1950-1985, pp. 54 and 92.
8renegement (by both sides)." Similarly, beginning in 1980, under the policy of fenzao ch?fan
(eating in different kitchens), the central government attempted to separate the central and
local budgets by establishing revenue contracts with the local authorities. As in thecase of
industrial enterprises, each province's circumstances were unique, requiring a different contract-
ing system. Thus, some provinces remitted a lump sum tax, others remitted a proportion of total
revenue, while, in still other cases, revenue sources were divided between central, local, shared
and "adjustment" (subject to yet another formula for sharing). Budgetary contracts, while often
"established" for five year periods, were, again much like enterprise contracts, subject to frequent
renegotiation as circumstances and policies changed.
For all its imperfections, the contracting system undoubtably hardened local and enterprise
budget constraints and improved fiscal and industrial efficiency by providing an objective func-
tion (albeit moving) with marginal rates of central taxation well below 100%. In theprocess,
however, it inadvertently devolved power to local authorities and strengthened the ties between
local governments and state enterprises. Enterprise contracting shifted power from the centre to
local governments since these, with their historical tax and administrative ties with enterprises
and detailed knowledge of local circumstances, were best positioned to negotiate and monitor
contracts for themselves and the central government. The hardening of local budgets increased
the interest of local authorities in industrial enterprises, where the main revenue surpluses were
to be found. Local governments could control input prices and costs, minimizing reported "prof-
its" (which might have to be shared with the centre), while still maximizing the surpluses avail-
able for local coffers. While local governments could draw revenue from industry, their broader
interest centred around the financial well-being of state enterprises as these traditionally provided
11. The Ii gai shui (tax-for-profit) system, advanced in 1982-1985, sought to limit the
need for detailed bargaining by introducing a complex set of interlocking and compensating uni-
versal tax rates which, varying by product, assets, etc., would compensate for all of the pre and
post-plan distortions. However, the ii gai shui initiative met with strong opposition and by 1986
was abandoned in favour of a return to enterprise by enterprise contracting.
9housing and a wide variety of social services (e.g. health, retirement, disability, burial, recre-
ation, etc.) to their workers. In sum, in attempting to harden budget constraints, in the context of
continued price distortions and no attempt to clarify the residual ownership of enterprises or
separate their social from their industrial functions, the central government merely transferred
enterprise control, and the responsibility for sustaining enterprise well-being, down to the local
level!2
A second, critical, reform initiative focused on the development of rural industry as a
means of absorbing surplus resources (i.e. labour) in the countryside. Beginning in 1977, the
decline in central procurement of farm products and capital equipment and the introduction of
rural labour responsibility systems freed material, capital and labour resources for use by rural
enterprises. While rural industry, as it developed during the Cultural Revolution, had previously
been restricted to sectors with small margins, such as agricultural machinery repair and farm
tools, these restrictions were now removed. Further, the central government actively encouraged
the development of rural industry by instructing the Agricultural Bank of China to provide low-
interest loans, requiring that half of state budgetary allocations to communes be used for rural
12. For a history of reforms in enterprise taxation and how these enlarged local power, see
Naughton [1985] and Wong [1987, 1992]. FEER, "The Grip Slips" (May 11, 1995) provides a
recent review of the degree to which central government control over finance has devolved into
the hands of local authorities. Song [1992] and Wong [1992] review the different types of
central-local contracting systems.
I should note that there also appears to have been a more direct transfer of political power
down to local levels. China, like other communist countries, uses a nomenklatura system, in
which each level of government has a list of positions over which it exercises power of appoint-
ment (which usually includes personnel in the next lower level of government). In 1983, as part
of a plan to decentralize and improve the efficiency of personnel management, two-thirds of the
positions controlled by the Central Committee were transfered down to lower levels. Provincial
and prefectural party committees also transferred control down to lower levels with, as an
extreme example, the provincial government of Heilongjiang retaining only 23 percent of its
original positions [Burns 1987]. It is difficult, however, to evaluate the practical significance of
these reforms as there was already significant consultation with lower level authorities who had
no formal nomenklatura authority (see Manion 1985, p. 217), while the length of the original
lists (the Central Committee exercised direct control over 13,000 appointments and oversight
over tens of thousands more) would have led to substantial rubber stamping of lower level pro-
posals.
10enterprise development, and instructing central and local authorities to incorporate the supply of
rural enterprises into their plans.'3 Most importantly, three year tax holidays were granted topar-
ticular industries (e.g. cement plants) and to all enterprises which might have some initial diffi-
culty in paying taxes, which, in practice, ended up granting exemption, on all income and
turnover taxes, to all new enterprises. With turnover/indirect taxes as high as 66% in some
sectors, tax exemptions were crucial, allowing rural enterprises, even inefficient rural enterprises,
to capture the rents implicit in the margins enjoyed by firms in the urban processing centres.
Local governments, spurred on by central initiatives aimed at hardening their budget constraints,
naturally supported this shifting of rents which, in the absence of well developed private capital
markets to support investment, was mostly undertaken by collective organizations. While tax
exemptions denied the central government any share of the captured rents, informal local levies
could determine their distribution between the collective organizations and local government
coffers. In 1984 contributions for local social expenditure and other levies amounted to 44% of
the nationwide after-tax profits of rural enterprises [Wong 1988J.
The growth of rural industry as the arbitrager of artificial price wedges inevitably led to the
development of interregional trade barriers. Local governments in regions which traditionally
produced raw materials moved downstream into processing, diverting outward bound raw mate-
rial shipments, at low planned prices, to their own factories. Traditional processors, starved of
material inputs, responded by sending buyers to raw material districts, offering above plan prices
directly to raw material producers such as farmers. Since their financial interests were linked to
processing, and not raw material production, governments in raw material producing districts
moved to prevent these sales, using trade barriers to turn themselves into monopsony buyers of
13. As with all Chinese policies, there were zigs and zags. In 1981-1982 rural entry into
some sectors was restricted and some rural enterprises were forcibly shut down. By 1984, how-
ever, these policies had been reversed in favour of further bank lending and the removal of most
restrictions on entry.
11raw materials at low prices. This led to the development of 'wars' over coal, cotton, jute, silk-
worm cocoons, and tobacco, among other materials.'4 In the area of finished goods, such as high
margin light industrial consumer products, the duplication of production throughout the country
led, reportedly, to growing overcapacity. As central controls over prices were relaxed and pri-
vate marketing channels developed, rural producers found themselves in competition with each
other and with the traditional, more efficient, producers of finished products. To protect their
industrial interests, provincial, county and, even, city governments found it expedient to erect
barriers to trade so as to maintain high local final industrial goods prices. Aside from tariff barri-
ers (i.e. special charges levied at road blocks), non-tariff methods such as physical barriers, out-
right prohibition, low interest loans and other financial benefits for commercial establishments
marketing local goods, fines for commercial establishments marketing non-local goods, legal
restrictions on price differences between local and non-local goods sold in commercial establish-
ments, local purchasing quotas, and administrative trivia (e.g. medical, sanitation, epidemic pre-
vention, product quality, measurement and other such licences and certificates) were used to
hamper trade in products as varied as textiles, automobiles, trucks, perfumes, beverages, plastics,
matches, household electrical appliances, electrical machinery, bicycles, pens, alcohol, washing
14. In the Chinese press, coverage of the battles to control resources, the diversion of
planned allocations to local industry, th.e interpretation of local motivations as an attempt to cap-
ture the rents implicit in price wedges, and the role the hardening of local budget constraints
played in spurring official intervention can be found in: Beijing Domestic Service 1100 GMT 24
May 86; Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service 1133 GMT 6 Dec. 1994; China Daily (Beijing, Busi-
ness Weekly) 10 Dec. 1990 p. 4.; .Jingji Cankao (Beijing) 4 June 1990 p. 1, 27 April 1990 p. 1,
24 June 1990 p. 1, and 20 July 1990 p. 1; Jingji Guanli (Beijing) No. 12 (Dec. 1989) pp. 18-21;
Jingji Ribac (Beijing) 11 Nov. 1989 p. 2; Jingjixue Zhoubao 30 April 1989 p. 1; Reninin Ribac
11 June 1990 p. 6; Zhongguo Tongxun She 0355 GMT 11 Aug. 1989; and Zhongguo Wujia No. 2
(Feb 95) pp. 13-17; See also PEER, "Trouble at mill" (7 March 1991) and "Protection Has a
Price" (August29 1996). With the exception of the PEER, all Chinese and Hong Kong news
services cited in this section are as reported and translated in the Foreign Broadcasting
tion Service.
12powders and soaps, tires, tractors, engines, processed foods, and food flavourings.'5 The legal
system was also subverted, as enterprises were encouraged not to pay non-local bills, the courts
ignored non-local pleas, rulings and fines were issued against non-local producers, and judges
who ruled in favour of non-local firms were punished.16
While the central regime railed, in a number of circulars, against interprovincial trade
wars, sent down task forces to mediate conflicts at provincial borders and even went so far as
establishing a separate ministry, the Ministry of Internal Trade, whose main purpose was to
enliven "circulation' and distribution, its other policies inadvertently encouraged interregional
conflict.7 Thus, for example, the allocation of special trading rights on a regional basis, inpar-
ticular to the Special Economic Zones and Guangdong province, led to conflict as other regions
tried to prevent the loss of export earnings brought about by the diversion of their exports to
15. For coverage of the trade barriers, reference to the growing overcapacity of a number
of industries brought about by excessive duplication, and interpretation of the interventions of
local governments as stemming from their financial relations with industrial enterprises, see
China Daily (Beijing) 9 June 1990 p. 1; Ching Chi Tao Pew (Hong Kong) No. 9 (5 March 1990)
pp. 8-9 and No. 37-38 (28 Sept. 92) pp. 12-15; FazhiRibao 19 April 1993 p. 1; Guangming
Ribao 3 Nov. 1990 p. 3; Guangxi Ribao 3 Feb. 1994; Hangzhou-Zhejiang Provincial Broadcast
Service 1000 GMT 21 Dec. 1990; Jingji Canlcao (Beijing) 24 June 1990 p. 1 and 4 June 1990 p.
1; Jingji Ribao (Beijing) 14 July 1990 p. 2; Liaowang (Beijing) No. 45 (6 Nov. 1989) pp. 18-20;
Qunyan (Beijing) No. 2 (7 Feb. 1991) pp. 22-23; Renmin Ribao 30 July 1990 p. 2 and 5 June
1990 p. 5; Shanxi Ribao 1 Dec. 1995 p. 1; Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong) 22 June 1990 p. 2; Tangtai
(Hong Kong) No. 41(8 Sep. 1990) pp. 13-14; Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong) 24 Jan. 1991 p. 6; Xin-
hua Domestic Service 0133 GMT 18 July 1984, 0815 GMT 8 May 1990, 1031 GMT 10 April
1990, and 0400 GMT 29 March 1992; and Zhongguo Tongxun She (Hong Kong) 0909 GMT 11
Feb. 1990. See also Economist, "China's feuding regions" (20 April 1996) and FEER, "Opening
doors" (2 April 1992).
16. On the use of the legal system, see Jingji Cankao (Beijing) 1 April 1990 p. 4.; Renmin
Ribao 10 Dec. 1991 p. 5; and Tangtai (Hong Kong) No. 41, 8 Sep. 1990 pp. 13-14.
17. Chen [1994, pp. 2, 33-36] indicates that central task forces were sent down, on an
annual basis, to mediate disputes at Zhejiang's borders. He also notes that circulars and direc-
tives against interregional trade barriers were issued by the State Council, Party Congress, Peo-
ple's Congress, etc. in 1980, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990. The
establishment of the Ministry of Internal Trade and its mission are highlighted in Beijing Central
Television Program One Network 1100 GMT 10 April 1993; China Daily 29 July 1993 p. 1; and
Renmin Ribao 2 August 1993 p. 2.
13these gateways to the international market.'8 Perhaps the most destructive element, however,
was the central regime's policy on price controls. During the Cultural Revolution, in recognition
of the fact that the policy of forced industrial diversification led to inefficient production, the
central regime allowed localities to set their own, higher, final goods prices [Wong 1987]. This
policy was maintained, and apparently expanded, during the reform period. With each round of
price liberalization, while the central government reduced the number of centrally mandated
price controls it simultaneously acquiesced to, explicitly allowed or, in some cases, even vig-
orously mandated, the local maintenance of price controls.19 In a planned economy, where state
18. While most regions were only allowed to retain about a quarter of the foreign
exchange generated by their exports, Shenzhen SEZ (in Ouangdong) was allowed to retain
100%. In 1988, Hunan and Guangxi were reported to be patrolling their border with Guangdong
province, restricting the movement of goods to their neighbour. Senior officials in both prov-
inces complained that goods shipped to Guangdong for subsequent export as "Guangdong"
goods robbed them of valuable foreign exchange. FEER, "Beggar thy neighbour" (12 January
1989). See also China Daily 4 April 1989 p. 4 and Zhongguo Xinwen She 1344 GMT 2 April
1992.
19. The nationwide decontrol of grain prices in 1992-1993 provides a wonderful example
of policies working at cross purposes. While the price of grain was supposed to move to market
levels, government pronouncements, at both the national and local level, stressed the importance
of provinces, prefectures and even localities keeping adequate grain reserves so as to manage the
price of grain in their jurisdiction. Similarly, localities were urged to improve "price inspection"
(for what purpose?) and to switch from mandatory grain procurement "quotas" to voluntary pur-
chase "contracts', which would ensure that prices did not rise too high or fall too low. One won-
ders how any of this could be accomplished without barriers to trade. See Jiangsu People's
Radio Network 1015 GMT 23 March 1993; Liaowang Overseas Edition (Chinese, Beijing) No.
51(21 Dec. 1992) p. 2; Xinhua Domestic Service 0734 GMT 2 April 1993 and 2102 GMT 22
April 1993; and Zhongguo Xinwen She (in English) 0844 GMT 3 Oct. 1992.
Explicit reference to the rights of local authorities (even below the provincial level) to set
their own prices is made in Jingji Ribac (Beijing) 8 June 1990 p. 3; Xinhua (Domestic Service)
0830 GMT 24 Feb. 1993 and 0531 GMT 13 March 1994; Xinhua (English) 1435 GMT 2 Sep.
1989; Zhongguo Wujia No. 8 (Aug. 1995) pp. 16-18; and Zhongguo Xinwen She 0915 GMT 4
Sep. 1993 and 1228 GMT 19 Oct. 1994. Examples of general reports on provincial price con-
trols and subsidies are given by Changsha Hunan Provincial Service 2300 GMT 24 Jan 1990;
China Daily (Business Weekly) 10 Jan. 1993 p. 3; Harbin Heilongjiang People's Radio Network
1000 GMT 8 April 1994; Hefei Anhui Provincial Service 1100 GMT 30 Dec. 1988; Nanfang
Ribao (Guangzhou) 19 March 1991 p. 1; Nanjing Jiangsu People's Radio Network 2300 GMT
23 July 1993; Reninin Ribao 6 Aug. 1990 p. 2 and 6 Oct. 1990 pp. 1 & 4 Shanghai City Service
0900 GMT 13 Sep. 1989; Wuhan Hubei People's Radio Network 1000 GMT 12 May 1994; Xin-
hua (English) 1103 GMT 30 Dec. 1988, 1507 GMT 20 Jan. 1990 and 0946 GMT 30 Nov. 1992;
and Zhejiang Ribao 27 July 1994 p. 1. The PEER ("The power of the purse," 18 June 1987)
reports that central attempts to free (and rationalize) the prices faced by industrial enterprises
14organs controlled the interregional movement of goods, price differentials could easily be
maintained. In a market economy, however, with atomistic private arbitragers hard at work,
large interregional differentials in the prices of traded goods could only be maintained with barri-
ers to trade. Thus, in the area of prices and the interregional movement of goods, the central
regime's 'reforms" ultimately degenerated, as they did in so many other areas, into a general
devolution of power into the hands of provincial arid sub-provincial governmental authorities.
By 1991, according to some estimates, somewhat less than one-third of enterprise transac-
tions took place at centrally fixed prices [Gelb, Jefferson & Singh 1993]. Since centrally man-
dated price distortions are gradually disappearing, what force, one might wonder, serves to
prevent local governments from reverting to free market principles? The answer to this question
is as old as the history of protectionism itself: local governments now find their financial and
political interests embeded in a particular industrial structure. These interests can be defended
using a variety of mechanisms. In raw material producing areas, export barriers convert process-
ing factories into monopsony buyers and, thereby, maintain the price distortions of the pre-
reform era. Elsewhere, import barriers, while impoverishing the local economy as a whole, can
induce artificially high returns in particular industrial sectors aust as in the import substitution
industries of so many other countries). Finally, when trade barriers cannot be fruitfully enforced,
or are viewed as being too costly to other local interests, there is always the banking system
which can be repeatedly pressured into extending credit to enterprises, providing local revenue
and employment at the expense of national inflation.20 Thus, while it is probably the case that
efficiency considerations, the demands of other social and political groups, and interregional
were often undermined by localities and government departments, which simply imposed new
controls.
20. On the ability of regional officials to force lending from branches of the state banking
system and their successful resistance to attempts to centralize control of the banking system, see
FEER, "At your service" (July 7 1994) and "Vital Signs" (March30 1995).
15competition for factors of production all place constraints on the distortionary activities of local
governments, it is also not unreasonable to argue that there is considerable hysterisis in public
finance and political relations. As the next section shows, many of the forceful trends of the
1980s, e.g. the duplication of industri1 structure and the growing dispersion of prices, had, by
the mid-l990s, come to a stop. They show, however, little tendency to reverse themselves.
16III. Data
While colorful anecdotes about interregional trade wars and complex descriptions of the
precise pattern of arbitrage opportunities created by central policies make for interesting reading,
in the context of China's economy, where policy switches back and forth, where contradictory
policies coexist side-by-side and where, to confound everything, almost every policy is "ad-
justed" to suit local circumstances, they are hardly compelling. For every anecdote on interre-
gional conflict, one can bring out five on growing interregional cooperation, and of course vice
versa. Similarly, accounts of the distorted objectives and motivations of local governments
easily become, when viewed through different lenses, fine examples of beneficial local interven-
tion, helping entrepreneurial collective enterprises use their mate skills and resources to develop
efficient and competitive industrial enterprises.2' In this section 1 move beyond anecdotes and
stories to the analysis of aggregate data.22
21. As strange as it may seem to readers, it is not uncommon for different observers to
hold completely opposite views on the meaning of almost any Chinese policy initiative, and even
the general thrust of government policy. For example, Jefferson and Rawski [1994, p. 62]
describe the 1992 State Council Regulations on Transforming the Management Mechanisms of
State Owned Industrial Enterprises as part of "an unprecedented and virtually unrestrained push
toward the market' during the 1990s. In contrast, Li [1996] views the 1990-1993 period as one
in which government control was reasserted, seeing the Regulations, in particular, as part of a
government attempt to "consolidate their strategic control rights over enterprises."
22. A complete description of the sources used for each part of the analysis is given in the
Appendix, while the data themselves are available at my website gsbwww.uchicago.edu/faclal-
wyn.young.
17A. Outputs
Figure II below presents the sum of the absolute and squared deviations of the sectoral out-
put shares of China's different provinces from the group average23 The longer time series, based
upon the socialist measure of national income', which excludes non-material sectors such as
finance and government administration, divides output into five sectors: agriculture, industry,
construction, transport and commerce. This series indicates a fairly stable degree of dispersion
during the 1950s and 1960s, with a secular downward trend appearing around 1969, i.e. during
the Cultural Revolution, when the central government promoted industrial diversification.
Between 1969 and 1978 the sum of absolute deviations, panel (a), fell 18 percent. Surprisingly,
during the reform period convergence continued apace, with the sum of absolute deviations fal-
ling an additional 16 percent from 1978 to 1992. The more conventional GDP series, which
divides output into primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors, shows yet more convergence, with
the sum of absolute deviations falling 25 percent by 1992. After 1992, the series flattens, attain-
ing a minimum in 1993, but thereafter returning to the levels of 1.992. As panel (b) shows, mea-
sures based upon the squared deviations from the average structure indicate even greater
convergence, with the sum of squared deviations falling 39 percent between 1969 and 1978
(national income measure) and then a further 48 percent by 1997 (GDP measure).
23. Specifically, the absolute and squared deviations equal
EISu—Sj
respectively, where S denotes the share of sectorj in province i's output and S equals the aver-
age, across i, of S. Since this cumulative measure is influenced by the number of sectors and
provinces used in its construction, one should not make too much of the levels of the different
series. The emphasis here is on trends, not levels.
As explained in the Appendix, China's provincial boundaries changed during the reform
period. In general, I work with the 30 provincial level administrative (and statistical) divisions in
place in 1996, adjusting the data as necessary to maintain consistent coverage. In regards to the
national income measure in the Figure, data on Tibet and Hainan do not extend back before
1979. Hence, that measure is based on only 28 provinces. Tibet and Hainan accounted for only
0.8 percent of provincial national income in 1992 (China Statistical Yearbook 1993, table 2-17).
18To establish the robustness of the preceeding results, Table II modifies and decomposes
Figure Il's analysis of the convergence in the structure of production. I compute, separately, the
sum of deviations from the provincial average structure and from the national structure (in effect,
the output weighted provincial average structure). As in Figure II, I compute the unweighted
sum of absolute and squared deviations, but also consider a weighting of each deviation by the
province's share of total GDP.24 Finally, I decompose the sum of deviations into those of the
coastal provinces, and those of the interior.25 As the reader can see, the weighted measures show
somewhat more convergence, indicating that the larger provinces moved more rapidly to the
average structure. Beyond that, the use of either the provincial average or national structure as
the benchmark has little effect on the results, while a breakdown of the deviations into the con-
tributions of the coastal and interior provinces indicates that convergence was widespread, i.e.
the sum of deviations fell substantially for both groups, with the relative strength of the effect
depending upon the measure examined.
Figure III below graphs the shares of primary, secondary and tertiary industry in the GDP
of each province in 1978 against the corresponding share in 1997, providing a more immediate
visual illustration of the convergence in the composition of output during the reform period.
Panel (b) shows the enormous compression in the variation in the share of secondary industry
(mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities) between 1978 and 1997. As highlighted by
the 45 degree line, provinces with high initial secondary shares witnessed a dramatic decline in
24. Thus, the sum of absolute weighted deviations from the national structure is given by
Xi3O*wIS1_SI,
1
wherew denotes the province's share of total provincial GDP, the 30 adjusts for the fact that the
average weight is 1/30, and =Jw1S.
25.The coastal provinces are Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang,
Pujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan. Together, these provinces accounted for
49 percent of provincial GDP in 1978 and 56 percent in 1997. Jilin touches the coast on a small
strip of land just north of Korea, but I do count it as a "coastal" province.
19the share of that sector, while provinces with low initial shares generally experienced a rise in its
contribution to GDP. Excluding the two outliers in the lower left hand corner of the figure (Hai-
nan and Tibet), the range of variation in the share of secondary industry went from between 34
percent and 77 percent in 1978 to between 37 percent and 54 percent in 1997. As regards
primary industry (agriculture, forestry and fishing), panel (a), most provinces saw a decline in
the share of that sector but the overall distribution was compressed as by far the largest reduc-
tions occurred in those provinces with high initial shares. Finally, as shown in panel (c), all
provinces increased the share of services in total production and, due to the appearance of
outliers such as Beijing and Shanghai, the degree of dispersion rose. The disproportionate
growth of service output in the urban centres most likely reflects the fact that both the develop-
ment and measurement26 of this natural urban activity were neglected under socialist planning.
It is important to distinguish between convergence in the composition of output, which is
predicted by a rise in interregional trade barriers, and convergence in absolute levels of output,
which is not. Figure IV graphs the standard deviation of the provincial GDPs per capita of pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary industry.27 As the Figure shows, while the variation of output per
capita of secondary industry has fallen steadily, this is not true for primary and tertiary output.
In particular, despite the convergence in the shares of primary industry (Figure III above), the
standard deviation of output per capita of primary products actually increased 37 percent
26. Since most services involved "non-material production", they were not measured in
the socialist concepts of National Income or Total Product of Society. The 1991-1992 Census of
Services led to an upward revision, of about 30 percent, in the estimated volume of service activ-
ity. In the national and provincial statistical series, it was assumed that virtually all of this (pre-
viously unmeasured) activity had developed since 1978 (compare, for example, China Statistical
Yearbook 1994 and 1995, table 2-10). It seems likely, however, that some of the newly
discovered output existed prior to the reform era.
27. The outputs in Figure IV, as well as those used in Figures II and III and in Table II, are
computed in nominal prices. Although I have collected data on interregional prices in China (see
the next Section), I lack the heroism necessary to convert these into regional PPP deflators. The
variation of the ln outputs per capita or the composition of output computed in constant prices (of
either 1978 or 1997) exhibits trends similar to those depicted in the Figures above.
20between 1978 and 1997. Trade barriers tend to lower the internal prices and realoutputs of prod-
ucts in which a region has a comparative advantage. This leads to aconvergence in the nominal
output shares of different sectors. The impact of this convergence in structure on the variation of
output per capita is, however, ambiguous and depends upon the correlation between patterns of
comparative and absolute advantage. For example, consider a poor region, with an absolute dis-
advantage in both agriculture and industry, and a comparative advantage in the former. With the
imposition of barriers to trade, the region's output of industrial products will rise, while its
output per capita of agricultural products, already below the national average, will fall. This will
decrease the interregional variation of industrial output per capita, while increasing the variation
of agricultural output per capita. Furthermore, putting aside trade barriers, the evolution of pat-
terns of absolute advantage during the reform period will have influenced the interregional dis-
persion of absolute output levels. The imposition of trade barriers has clear implications for the
interregional variation in output shares; it has no prediction regarding the variation in the
absolute output levels.
21B. Prices
Ceteris paribus, trade barriers, which segment markets, will increase the variation of prices
across those markets. Consequently, in this section I examine time trends in the standard devi-
ation of the in of regional goods prices.
While price indices for the different regions of the Chinese economy are widely published
and easily available, data on the actual prices of goods are more sparse and problematic. Using
public sources, I have been able to collect four different data sets on regional prices, specifically:
(1) Annual data on the retail prices of 305 consumer goods in 30 cities for the period 1986-1993;
(2) Annual data on the prices of 130 agricultural goods purchased by commercial establishments
in the 30 provinces during the period 1986-1993; (3) Monthly data on the market prices of 49
industrial materials in 36 cities for the period 3/90 to 5/99; and (4) Monthly data on the market
prices of 33 agricultural products in 36 cities for the period 6/93 to 5/99. While the figures listed
above outline the full range of products and locations covered by the data, it is important to note
that there are numerous gaps. Products enter and leave the published series, while numerous
cities/provinces report no data, and the locales omitted in this fashion vary from product to prod-
uct and period to period.28 The annual data form the basis of the decades old retail price and
farm products purchasing price indices. While the reported locales are fairly stable, the number
of products present varies considerably. Overwhelmed by the number of new products appearing
in the economy, the State Statistical Bureau completely abandoned the collection of this data in
1994.29 The monthly price data represent a new effort, begun at the turn of the decade, by the
China Price Information Centre, a division of the Planning Committee. There is little change
28, All of which provides some insight into what lies behind the ubiquitous price indices.
29. However, the various price indices continued to be published. According to officials
at the SSB (personal communication), each locale was instructed to compile the index in the
manner it saw fit and report to the SSB, which would then combine the local price indices to
form the published series.
22over time in the reported products, but there is great (although seemingly random) month to
month variation in the reporting cities. Table Ill summarizes the characteristics of the different
series.
I take the simplest approach to the analysis of these unbalanced panels, regressing the In of
the standard deviation of the in prices of each product in each time period on a complete set of
product and time dunmiies, using the repeated observations of the product standard deviations to
infer trends in the overall dispersion of prices.30 In Figure V I report the value of the time dum-
mies, relative to a base period of zero. Panels (a) and (b) examine the dispersion of the annual
data, using 1986 as the base period. As the Figure shows, the dispersion of both retail and
agricultural prices rose rapidly between 1986 and 1989, after which it fell, and then rose again.
Overall, there was a highly significant positive time trend in retail price dispersion of about 2.4
percent per annum (t=8.0) and a somewhat weaker, albeit still significant (t=2. 1), positive trend
of 1.4 percent per annum in the dispersion of agricultural prices. Panels (c) and (d) extend the
analysis to the monthly data, taking as the base period 6/93,theinitial period of the agricultural
market price data and approximately the endpoint of the annual estimates in panels (a) and (b).
As the reader can see, the monthly price data have gone through bouts of falling and rising dis-
persion. These fluctuations minor the patterns in the overlapping period of the annual data, with
a reduction in dispersion in 1990-1991 followed by rising dispersion in 1991-1993, but the
30. In essence, I ignore the variation in the locales used to compute each standard devi-
ation, under the assumption that they vary randomly. I have experimented with other
approaches. For example, I construct a chained balanced panel by taking paired observations on
locales in adjacent periods. Taking each group of pairs (representing observations on the prices
of a product in common locales in two adjacent periods) as a "product", I then regress the in
standard deviations on time dummies and a full set of "product" dummies. The movements of
the time dummies are similar, although, given the chain, the standard errOrs explode as one
moves away from the base period. In another approach, I regress the ln of the squared residuals
from a regression of ln prices on time x product dummies (i.e. deviations from time x product
means) on sets of product, time and locale dummies, to search for time related patterns of heter-
oskedasticity (adjusted for locale specific heteroskedasticity). This approach is not without its
problems (see Green 1993, p. 400), as the timex product means depend upon the locales present
in each period. In any case, the results are once again similar.
23movements are considerably grosser, with the mean monthly industrial materials price dispersion
rising 23 percent from 1991 to 1993. These bouts of falling and rising dispersion are consistent
with trade wars which are periodically interrupted and suppressed by the central government,
only to resume once again, when central attention focuses on other matters,3' In any case,
regardless of the interpretation, there is no indication of any trend toward reduced price disper-
sion in the 1990s.32
To summarize, the quality of Chinese price data is extremely poor. The data, such as they
are, indicate a rise in dispersion during the late 1980s. During the 1990s, price dispersion has
waxed and waned, but shows no clear tendency to reverse the increases of the previous decade.
31, These fluctuations in price dispersion do not appear to be driven by variation in the
locales present in the data. As noted in the footnote above, when I construct a chained balanced
sample, or estimate time series heteroskedasticity with controls for locale specific heteroskedas-
ticity, I get similar results. If anything, the magnitude of the fluctuations is substantially greater.
For example, in the chained balanced sample the mean monthly standard deviation of industrial
materials prices rises 72 percent (!)between1991 and 1993.
Alternatively, one might worry that the fluctuations are driven by changes in the overall
rate of price inflation. To this end, I have used balanced sample locale pairs to construct period
by period estimates of the rate of inflation in each product, and found that product inflation dur-
ing the period has either an insignificant, or a significantly negative, effect on price dispersion.
In any case, the estimated pattern of fluctuations is, once again, largely unaffected,
Finally, I should also note that it is unlikely that measurement error explains these fluctua-
tions. Measurement error is included in the estimates of the standard deviation of ln prices. For
it to generate the pattern in the Figure, it would be necessary that the quantity of measurement
error cycled up and down, in a serially correlated fashion. The only information I have on this is
that, according to officials in the Price Information Centre, with the introduction of computer
coding in the past two years they have made attempts to weed out errors, e.g. asking for confir-
mation of numbers which deviate excessively from figures reported in earlier months. Yet, dur-
ing 1998 and 1999 the estimated standard deviations rose rapidly, as part of a new upswing.
32. Actually, the industrial materials price standard deviations have a significant positive
trend (.09 percent per month), while the agricultural market price standard deviations have a sig-
nificant negative trend (-.2 percent per month), but anyone glancing at the sinusoidal pattern of
the monthly dummies in Figure V can see that these coefficients might easily be eliminated with
the addition of a few more months of data.
24C. Alternatives and a Variance Decomposition
While evidence of a convergence in the structure of production and some divergence of
prices is consistent with an increase in interregional trade barriers, it is also consistent with a
variety of other hypotheses. One might argue that the factor endowments and relative producti-
vities of China's diverse provinces appear quite dissimilar when viewed in isolation, but surpris-
ingly homogeneous when contrasted with the rest of the world. If so, then when China was a
closed economy its provinces would have specialized in different sectors, but once China opened
to the international market each province would naturally find its comparative advantage in a
common industrial structure. Alternatively, it is possible that interreg.ional patterns of compara-
tive advantage converged during the reform period and that this, without any appeal to internal
trade barriers or the opening to the international market, explains the convergence in the
composition of output. Regarding the divergence of prices during the late 1980s, if the reform
period has seen a growth of product variety, with different provinces specializing in different
varieties, then, absent any change in interregional price arbitrage, this would naturally lead to
growing price dispersion within product categories. Further, with increased regional specializa-
tion within product categories, temporary economic shocks might have uneven effects across
localities, generating the bouts of converging and diverging prices observed during the 1990s.
A simple variance decomposition answers some, albeit not all, of the counterargutnents
listed above. In Table IV below I decompose the interregional variance of the relative output of
primary to secondary industry, two predominantly tradeable sectors,32 into the variance of labour
productivities, the variance of labour allocations, and the covariance between the two. As the
reader can see, during the reform period the interregional variance across 28 of China's prov-
33. In Chinese data, primary industry includes agriculture, forestry and fishing, while sec-
ondary industry includes mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities. In producing the cal-
culations for the United States (using the BEA data described in the Appendix), I construct
sectoral aggregates using the Chinese definitions.
25inces of the In relative output of primary to secondary industry went down. Surprisingly, during
the same period the variance of provincial relative labour productivities and labour allocations
both rose. In other words, while China's provinces became more similar in terms of the compo-
sition of final output, they became increasingly dissimilar in terms of sectoral productivities and
sectoral labour allocations, with the decline in the variance of outputs only appearing as a
consequence of the development of a strong negative covariance between productivities and fac-
tor allocations. If the convergence in the composition of output across China's provinces is
driven by a convergence in patterns of comparative advantage, then one should observe a
growing similarity of labour allocations and productivities (i.e. the economies should be increas-
ingly similar on all dimensions). Similarly, common specialization driven by the opening to the
international market should be accompanied by a growing similiarity of labour allocations. None
of this is present in the data.
For contrast, Table IV also presents a variance decomposition of the regional output of the
United States, and a longer time series for a subset of Chinese provinces. Between 1977 and
1994 the variance of the relative output of primary to secondary industry across U.S. states fell
rapidly. Unlike China, however, in the United States this convergence was associated with a
large decline in the variance of labour allocations. Examining a longer time series for 14 prov-
inces of the People's Republic,24 between 1952 and 1965 we observe rapid convergence in the
structure of production driven by a substantial decline in the variance of labour productivities
and labour allocations. During the period 1965-1978, when central policy, and the chaos of the
Cultural Revolution, encouraged regional industrial duplication, the convergence of outputs con-
tinued, but the mechanism changed, as the decline in the variance of relative outputs came from a
deteriorati.on of the covariance between productivities and allocations. This transformation of
the mechanism behind productive convergence reached fruition during the reform period
34. Together, these provinces accounted for 52% of provincial GDP in 1978.
26(1978-1997) when, in this sample, as in the aggregate economy, the variance of productivities
and allocations grew, while their covariance continued to deteriorate.
In sum, the convergence in the structure of production observed in U.S. states in recent
decades and in Chinese provinces in the early postwar era is quite consistent with explanations
that emphasize either increasing integration into the international market or aconvergence in pat-
terns of comparative advantage. However, the continued convergence of the Chinese economy
during, first, the Cultural Revolution and, then, the reform period is not consistent with such
explanations. The later Chinese data are, however, compatible with a rise in trade barriers. A
growing diversity of nominal labour productivities could easily arise from growing interregional
price disparities, which would increase both the variation of relative prices and, due to a decline
in factor price equalization, the variation of relative real labour productivities. A rise in the vari-
ance of labour allocations could come from increasingly perverse labour allocations, as prov-
inces poured resources into areas of comparative disadvantage, a view which would also not be
incompatible with the growing negative correlation between productivities and factor
allocations.35
35. As noted first by Ford [1967] and, then, Falvey [1981], trade barriers tend to raise the
relative productivity of labour in industries in which an economy has a comparative advantage.
This result holds whether the source of comparative advantage is aggregate relative factor sup-
plies (capital and labour), the supply of sector specific capital (with labour mobile between sec-
tors), or sector specific total factor productivity. Further, while the imposition of trade barriers
should, starting from free trade, lead to a diminishing variation of factor (labour) allocations,
once factor allocations become perverse (i.e. if regions concentrate factors withth sectors of com-
parative disadvantage), further impediments to trade will lead to a growing interregional varia-
tion of factor allocations. Consequently, one could interpret the rising variances and
deteriorating covariances in Table IV as evidence of increasing trade barriers.
The preceeding argument, however, is not quite correct. First, one can show that in a two-
by-two Heckscher-Ohlin framework in which, say, all economies have the same capital-labour
ratios but have different relative sectoral total factor productivities, if the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour is greater than one then under free trade labour productivity will
actually be lower in the industry in which the economy has a comparative advantage. Since
trade barriers tend to raise relative labour productivity in the industry in which the economy has
a comparative advantage (the Ford-Falvey result), it follows that, starting from a point of free
trade, a rise in trade barriers will, at least initially, lead to a decrease in the interregional variation
of relative labour productivities.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Ford-Falvey analysis is based upon real pro-
27At this point, a critic might observe that the preceeding discussion, including the counterar-
guments that motivated this section, is all based upon the analysis of a free market economy
moving from one state to another as a consequence of a change in an underlying 'exogenous'
variable, i.e. patterns of comparative advantage, openness to the world, or interprovincial trade
barriers. However, the Chinese economy in 1978 was a distorted, centrally-planned construct.
As such, there is no sensible way to use the customary comparative statics of trade theory to
understand its evolution since then, whether that evolution has been toward a free market (the
conventional view) or distortionary local planning (the view of this paper). In other words, an
adamant skeptic might simply argue that all of the preceeding data on outputs, prices, labour pro-
ductivities and factor allocations is, for an appropriately complex set of initial centrally planned
distortions, perfectly compatible with a movement to the free market.
In this paper I have shown that during the reform period interregional outputs converged
and interregional prices diverged (or, at least, fluctuated wildly). These data are compatible with
a rise in interregional trade barriers. They are also somewhat at odds with a movement to mar-
ket, given the conventional view that, historically, Chinese central planning led to excessive
interregional duplication of industries. To establish the argument, however, I need to present
ductivities. As highlighted by the price terms in the column headings of Table IV, my data con-
cern nominal productivities, i.e. real productivities multiplied by prices. Since prices tend to be
lower in products in which a region has a comparative advantage, in nominal terms the
Ford-Falvey analysis can be reversed, i.e. in the presence of barriers to trade a region might
actually have a comparative advantage in products with lower relative nominal productivities.
Consequently, all one can say is that the data in the Table are compatible with a rise in trade
barriers, i.e. they are one, of many possible, configurations (they are, however, regardless of
elasticities of substitution or prices, quite incompatible with a convergence in patterns of com-
parative advantage or the movement of factors in response to an opening to the world market).
For what its worth, the analysis in constant prices, of either 1978 or 1997, looks much the
same. This, however, is not a perfect solution, as there is still the problem of the base year prices
and their correlation with patterns of comparative advantage. In any case, as I discuss in the text,
it is somewhat fanciful to use the traditional constructs of trade theory to understand the trans-
ition from distorted central planning. Consequently, rather than pursue the Ford-Falvey empha-
sis on relative labour productivities, in the next section 1 develop direct measures of comparative
advantage, showing that factor allocations are, indeed, becoming increasingly perverse.
28evidence of a movement of factor allocations away from patterns of comparative advantage, i.e.
of an increasingly distorted interregional allocation of factors. Ideally, such evidence should be
uncontaminated by potentially distorted price measures. Further, the measure of comparative
advantage, and the interpretation of the results as a movement toward regional autarky, should be
invariant with respect to the economic regime, be it central planning, local planning or free mar-
ket. To this end, in the next section I turn to the analysis of agricultural yields, factor allocations
and the weather.
2911 Agriculture and the Weather
Panel (a) in Figure VI below plots the average yield of land sown with grain against the
overall labour intensity of agricultural production in 27 Chinese provinces in 1978.36 The typical
economist would not find the positive association depicted in the Figure surprising. The greater
the quantity of inputs applied per hectare of agricultural land, the greater should be the yield per
unit of that land. With grain, the principal agricultural product, accounting for the lion's share of
hectares sown, it is not surprising that the yield of land sown with grain rises with the overall
labour intensity of agricultural activity in a province.37 Unfortunately, by 1997, as shown in
panel (b), this "natural' positive association had completely disappeared. This development
forces one to reexamine the logic of panel (a).
A positive association between labour per hectare and yield per hectare might reflect cau-
sality running from the x axis to the y axis, but it can also reflect causality running from the y
axis to the x axis. If one thinks of all provinces as having the same agricultural "technology",
then the causality runs exclusively from x to y, as greater labour inputs per hectare result in
greater yields per hectare. However, there are likely to be substantial differences across prov-
36. Following the data I will use in Table V below, I use the 29 provincial-level adminis-
trative divisions in place in 1985, including Hainan under Guangdong and Chongqing under
Sichuan. With data on primary employment in Tianjin and Zhejiang in 1978 unavailable, this
leaves the 27 provinces depicted in the Figure.
37. In 1978 grain accounted for 80% of total hectares sown. In 1997 the share of grain
was 73%. Within grain, the shares of rice, wheat, corn and tubers in total hectares sown was
29%, 24%, 17% and 10%, respectively, in 1978, and 28%, 27%, 21% and 9%, respectively, in
1997. It is hard to believe that these small changes in the overall role of grain and its composi-
tion account for the results which follow. (All data from the China Statistical Yearbook).
More problematic, perhaps, is my use of the labour in primary industry (not, I should
emphasize, the rural labour force, which includes labour engaged in non-primary activities) as a
measure of the labour devoted to the cultivation of land. It is possible that an increasing share of
primary sector labour is devoted to non-farming activities, e.g. forestry, animal husbandry and
fishing. I should note, however, that in the analysis below (Table V) I use direct measures of
inputs which are more exclusive to farming, e.g. irrigation and chemical fertilizers. The evolving
relationship between these factors and measures of comparative advantage, which will be my
main emphasis, is the same as that of primary labour.
30inces, with some locales having land and weather conditions more suitable to the cultivation of
grain and agricultural products in general. These provinces, endowed with a superior
"technology", will have more productive land, raising the marginal product of labour on that land
and drawing labour into the sector. In this case, the causality will run both fromx to y and from
y to x, as greater yields lead to a greater labour intensity of production.
To explain the orthogonality between factor intensities and yields apparent in panel (b),
one merely has to pervert the causality running from yields to factor intensities by, say, introduc-
ing interregional barriers to trade. With barriers to trade, the tendency for factors to flow into
more productive sectors can be weakened and, possibly, reversed. In a free market economy,
provinces with better agricultural yields would experience a decline in the price of grain, which
would reverse the flow of factors of production into that sector. In China, with the enduring
national and local controls over the price of grain, price mechanisms such as this are unlikely to
be at play. Nevertheless, the quantity restrictions implied by price controls and localprocure-
ment plans will generate the same effect, as in provinces with productive land, farm labour, faced
with limited internal demand, migrates into industrial activity. Evidence in favour of a reversal
of the link between yields and factor intensities is given by panel (c) of Figure VI, which shows
that the provinces with the most productive agricultural sectors in 1978 were the ones that, rela-
tive to the mean change, experienced the greatest declines in the labour intensity of agricultural
production. With a sufficient perversion of the causality running from yields to factor intensities
(y to x), one can overcome the natural relation between factor intensities and yields (x to y), pro-
ducing the orthogonal cloud of panel (b) in Figure VI.
To support the preceeding argument about perverse allocations, one would like to have a
measure of the suitability of different regions for agricultural production and show that factor
allocations have moved against that measure. Ideally, the measure should be time invariant,
uninfluenced by all of the remarkable changes in regional comparative advantage that, most
surely, have accompanied 20 years of reform and growth. As such a measure, I choose: the
31weather. In Table V below I regress a panel of provincial grain yields during the period 1985 to
1997 on various measures of agricultural factor inputs and rainfall, with provincial dummies to
control for mean effects on yields. Turning, first, to the weather, I find that grain yields rise with
moderate (but not excessive) quantities of rainfall, and are negatively related to the monthly vari-
ation in that rainfall. This seems completely intuitive. Turning to the measures of other inputs, I
find that grain yields rise with the share of agricultural land which is irrigated, and with the
application of fertilizer. However, the total power of agricultural machinery and quantity of
labour per hectare of agricultural land have no significant impact on yields. These results minor
panel (b) of Figure VI.38 I interpret them as reflecting the negative response of these factor allo-
cations to omitted variables which, from year to year, favour yields in one region or another.
Using the coefficients from my regression of yields on rainfall, I derive a synthetic
measure of provincial weather-dependent comparative advantage in agriculture (weather) as
the mean annual value of the combined effects of precipitation, precipitation squared and the
variation of precipitation.39 In colunms (2) through (7) I then regress various measures of factor
inputs on this measure interacted with time ('Wtime'). With provincial dummies included in the
regression (as in the upper panel of the Table), the coefficient on Wtime indicates the association
38. I should emphasize that, because of the absence of weather data for earlier years, the
analysis in the Table begins in 1985. By that time, the relation between labour intensity and
yields had already begun to deteriorate.
39. Strictly speaking, this is a measure of absolute advantage. However, if absolute
advantage in the non-agricultural segments of the economy is orthogonal to the weather, as it
plausibly might be, then, subject to random error, 'weather" is a measure of comparative advan-
tage as well.
32between the provincial trends of the dependent variable and the favourableness of the weather.4°
As the Table indicates, over time provinces with better weather withdrew factors of production
from agriculture. The coefficients on the application of irrigation, fertilizer,power (machinery)
and labour are all highly significantly negative, as is the coefficient on the share of the labour
force in agriculture. The output per capita of grain products also moved against patterns of com-
parative advantage (column 7). The magnitude of the coefficients indicate that a standard devi-
ation increase in the value of weather (.026) was associated with about 1 percent per annum
slower growth in the application of fertilizer and in the output of grains per capita, and about 1/2
percent per annum slower growth in the application of irrigation, power and labour. Excluding
Wtime from the regression, one finds that the mean provincial trend growth of irrigation, fertil-
izer, power, labour and output per capita was 1.0, 7.0, 4.2, 0.0, and 1.0 percent per annum,
respectively. With regards to the share of the labour force in agriculture, the only variable not
measured in lns, a standard deviation increase in the favourableness of the weather was asso-
ciated with a .2 percent faster decline in the labour share, or a 2.4 percent fall over the entire
sample period. During the same period, the mean provincial share of labour in agriculture fell
from .59 to .49. In sum, the effects are both statistically and empirically significant.
As a test of robustness, in the lower panel of Table V I run the same regressions without
provincial dummies, including both the mean value of the weather and its interaction with time.
Without provincial dummies, the regressions in columns (2) through (7) no longer examine the
provincial trends in the dependent variable, but instead indicate the trend in the cross sectional
association between the level of the dependent variable and the quality of provincial weather.
40. To see this, write the regression as:
(1) )'=
where Y represents the dependent variable, W is my measure of comparative advantage, the a's
are the provincial dummies, i denotes the province and t (running from 0 to T) time. Partialing
out the provincial dummies, one finds that:
(2) Y —= —T/2)+BW*(t
—T12)+
33On the face of it, the results now appear considerably weaker, as most of the coefficients on
Wtime are insignificant. However, as the reader can see, the coefficients on Wtime are actually
identical to those in the upper panel. In a balanced panel, the orthogonalization of an observa-
tional unit mean interacted with time, i.e. a variable such as Wtime, with respect to either unit
dummies or the observational unit mean itself yields the exact same residuals as independent
regressors.4' Consequently, the only reason why the coefficients on Wtime are insignificant in
the lower panel is because, without provincial dummies, the fit of the regression worsens consid-
erably, leading to the conclusion that there is considerably more "error" variance in the depen-
dent variable and, consequently, much less confidence in any parameter estimate. It seems
reasonable to recognize that the mean provincial value of the dependent variables in colunms (2)
-(7)might vary for reasons other than the weather, and that provincial dummies are an accept-
able means of controlling for such effects. Nevertheless, I include the results in the lower panel
to show the reader how the results I have emphasized can be weakened.
Colunm (8) of Table V reruns the regression of colunm (1) with Wtime instead of the
annual weather variables. As this colunm shows, relative to average trends, provinces with good
weather experienced declining yields. This result is not particularly surprising. As columns (2) -
(6)showed, the trend growth of all of the factor inputs I have measured has varied negatively
with the quality of the weather. It seems likely that this negative correlation extends to other,
unmeasured, complementary inputs, If so, the estimated impact of the weather on yields would
diminish over time. Colunm (8) does, however, highlight the weaknesses of the methodology I
41. In other words, after partialing out the effect of W1, the right-hand side variables are
the same as in the preceeding footnote. The left-hand side variable, of course, is different, but
the additional variation is only across i categories (the t dimension variation within each i cate-
gory is unchanged). As the only variation of the orthogonalized right-hand side variables is
across t (their mean, within each i category, is zero), the coefficients are unchanged. I should
note that the regressions in colunm (4) are unbalanced (I am missing an observation on power for
• one province), and hence the coefficients differ slightly between the upper and lower panels of
the Table.
34have pursued. Omitted factor inputs bias the coefficients on rainfall, while omitted measures of
comparative advantage bias the coefficients on other factor inputs (e.g. power and labour),
thereby further distorting the coefficients on rainfall. Consequently, my synthetic measure of the
'weather' is subject to considerable error and bias. As a sensitivity test, I have reestimated col-
umn (1) using the data for 1985 alone or using the data for 1985-1989, and the results (for the
whole table) are much the same. I have no means, with the data at my disposal, to even begin to
address problems of endogeneity and bias, but the results do not seem sensitive to reasonable re-
specifications.
As a final defence, the unrepentent skeptic might reinterpret the preceeding results as
merely showing that Chinese agricultural production during the reform period has become less
dependent upon the weather, the simple manifestation of technological progress that has under-
mined historical sources of comparative advantage in agriculture. Denied the possibility that
even the weather has remained an enduring source of comparative advantage in agriculture, I am
forced to return to the simple correlations that motivated the analysis of Table V. Figure VII
below graphs the relationship between grain yields and the labour intensity of agricultural pro-
duction in 15 Chinese provinces across the entire post-war era.42 As the Figure shows, from
1952 to 1978 there was, consistently, a significant positive correlation between these two
variables. By 1997 that correlation was gone. For almost thirty years, with all of the excesses
and inefficiencies of central planning, there existed a completely sensible relation between
labour inputs and land yields. During the reform period's "movement to market", this relation
disappeared. It is difficult to argue that the complete elimination of a correlation between factor
intensities and yields is consistent with the rationalization of production and factor allocations in
42. The 15 provinces are Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Anhui,
Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang. Together,
these provinces accounted for 5 1.5% of grain output in 1978.
35response to market incentives. It is.quite consistent, however, with an economy where the
regional structure of production, through local bureaucratic control, has been distortedaway
from patterns of comparative advantage, be these founded in the weather, or other sources.
36IV. Conclusion
The central proposition of this paper is, seemingly, unbelievable. One is askedto accept
that 20 years of economic reform in the People's Republic, which havebrought extraordinary
economic growth and burgeoning international openness, have resulted ina fragmented internal
market with fiefdoms controlled by local officials whose economic andpolitical ties to protected
industry resemble those of the Latin American economies of past decades. It seems plausible
that the endogenous response of actors to the rent seeking opportunites createdby gradualist
reform could give rise to new distortions, whose lifespan far exceeds that of the rents which
motivated their arrival. Nevertheless, it seems hard to believe that thispaper, drawing its inspira-
tion from a broad reading of popular Chinese media, has hitupon a creditable example.
The central proposition of this paper is, surprisingly, supported by a wide variety of data.
Anecdotal stories of industrial duplication are supported by data on the structure of GDP, which
show widespread convergence in the structure of production during the reform period,despite
what is reputed to have already been extensive, and presumablyexcess, diversification under the
plan. The interregional variation of prices rose during the 1980s, and then fluctuated wildly dur-
ing the l990s, patterns compatible with anecdotes of interregional trade wars that are periodi-
cally suppressed by central intervention. While regional relative outputs have converged,
regional relative factor allocations and labour productivities have, bizarrely, diverged, which
undermines attempts to explain the output movements as driven by free market forces andpat-
terns of comparative advantage. Finally, the natural link between labour intensity and agricul-
tural yields, present even under central planning, completely vanishes during the reform period,
while the correlation between agricultural factor allocations and the quality of the weather
weakens as provinces with better weather conditions shed factors of production. Although indi-
vidual pieces of this evidence can be explained away, in their totality, they are difficult to dis-
miss. There is every indication that the economy of the People's Republic, while openingup
37internationally, has become fragmented internally.
Fundamentally, this paper argues that the so-called 'liberalization" and "transformationt of
the People's Republic over the past 20 years is perhaps best characterized as a process of devolu-
tion. Although the central government has released control over prices, outputs and enterprise
budgets, these functions have been taken up, albeit in a less systematic fashion, by local
governments. Thus, China has moved from having one central plan to having many, mutually
competitive, central plans. lit is not hard to believe that the control and incentive problems that
plague planning are more easily managed at the provincial and county level than they are at the
continental level. Consequently, whatever the welfare costs of the new distortions, it is not sur-
prising that on net the devolution of power has greatly increased welfare, as witnessed by the
extraordinary growth of the past two decades.43 An economic system characterized by
government control, even local government control, over prices, output and investment is not,
however, typically viewed as being conducive to long term prosperity. It remains to be seen
whether the central government of the People's Republic can wrest back enough power from its
43. Surprisingly, it is actually possible to argue that overall improvements in efficiency
during the reform period have not been that high. The Chinese national accounts are somewhat
unusual in that the statistical authorities depend upon firms to report both the nominal and real,
i.e. inflation adjusted, value of output. As noted by Ruoen [1995] and Woo [1995] it is likely
that most enterprises do not make proper adjustments for inflation. The Chinese statistical
authorities do, however, separately collect price statistics. If one uses these price indices to
deflate the nominal value of output, non-agricultural GDP growth during the reform period is
found to be about 2.5 percent slower per annum than officially reported. Crude total factor pro-
ductivity calculations then suggest that, taking into account rising participation rates, improved
educational levels and the transfer of labour out of agriculture, total factor productivity growth in
the non-agricultural economy during the reform period has been about 1.4 percent per annum;
respectable, but by no means as extraordinary and unprecedented as the output growth reported
in official statistics. Thus, it is possible that the reforms, and local government control, while
expediting a movement of (possibly slack) resources out of agriculture and continuing to encour-
age valuable investment in physical and human capital, have not been especially successful in
raising the efficiency with which resources are used in the non-agricultural sector. This
conclusion, however, depends upon the adjustment of the Chinese output deflators. If one
accepts the official reported deflators, then post reform TFP growth in the non-agricultural sector
is spectacular, i.e. at least 3 percent per annum for 20 years. These calculations are discussed
further in Young 112000].
38regions, enforcing the moral equivalent of the interstate commerce clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, restricting the power of local governments to control the interregional movement ofgoods
and factors, without, however, reestablishing inefficient central controlover the same. This
would allow it to bring out the most virtuous aspects of interregional localgovernment competi-
tion, while restricting its more pernicious manifestations.
39V. Appendix: Sources
Table I and Figure I: In Chinese data, government revenue by sector is computed net of
enterprise losses. Historically, price subsidies were counted as negative revenue, while debt
issues and payments were counted as part of revenue and expenditure, respectively. Price subsi-
dies were shifted from revenue to expenditure in 1986. Beginning in 1994, debt and interest
were no longer included under revenue and expenditure. Further, in that year all capital
construction financed by foreign borrowing was removed from expenditure. Using the data on
various budgetary items in the China Statistical Yearbook and the China Public Finance
book I construct a consistent series, which underlies the data in Table I and Figure I, using the
following definitions: (1) price subsidies are counted as part of expenditure, not negative
revenue; (2) debt issues and interest payments are excluded from revenue and expenditure (I
could not separate out interest payments alone); (3) capital formation financed by foreign bor-
rowing is included in expenditure; and (4) revenue by sector continues to be computed net of
enterprise losses.
An important issue is the treatment of "extra-budgetary" revenue, which grew from 31 per-
cent of revenue in 1978 (using my series, which matches the most recent official definition of
revenue) to 111 percent in 1992. Until 1992 the definition of extra-budgetary revenue included
the various surchages and levies raised by government departments as well as the many funds
retained by enterprises but earmarked for specific use, e.g. welfare, bonus, and capital construc-
tion and technical updating funds. Although local governments tap these funds [Wong 1991a], it
seems excessive to consider the full value of these funds as being under government budgetary
control. In 1993 Chinese statistics stopped counting the funds of state-owned enterprises and
agencies as part of extra-budgetary revenue, lowering extra-budgetary revenue to 33 percent of
the value of budgetary revenue in that year. In any case, since I have not been able to find data
on extra-budgetary funds by sector of origin or an historical breakdown of non-state enterprise
extra-budgetary funds into local and central categories, I do not include extra-budgetary funds in
the analysis of Table I and Figure I.
I should note that extra-budgetary funds are not the sole problem with Chinese budgetary
data. While villages have no formal budgetary authority (and are not counted in the consolidated
budget), they have developed their own revenues and expenditures [Wong 1997, pp. 198-199].
At the same time, other levels of government have shifted both personnel and capital expendi-
tures off-budget [Wong et al 1995, pp. 129-130]. In sum, it is clear that during the reform period
the official budgetary data account for an increasingly small share of total public finance.
However, trends during the reform period are not my emphasis. I use the data in Table I and
Figure I merely to establish the important revenue role of industry at the beginning of the
reforms and emphasize the meaningless character of distinctions between "local' and "central"
revenue in a system where virtually all revenue was collected by local authorities.
Table II and Fi2ures II. Ill and IV: Each province in China publishes a statistical year-
book. The data on provincial GDP by sector come from the annual issues of these yearbooks.
National income by sector is compiled from the Hsueh, Li and Liu [1993], A Compilation of
Historical Statistics (State Statistical Bureau 1990) and the annual issues of the China Statistical
Yearbook.
I should note that until 1988 China was divided administratively into 29 provinces, provin-
cial level cities and autonomous territories. In 1988 Hainan, formerly a part of Guangdong,
became a separate province, while in 1997 Chongqing city was removed from Sichuan. Revised
historical data separating Hainan and Guangdong are generally available, although similar data
separating Chongqing from Sichuan are not. So, to maintain consistency, I add Chongqing back
into Sichuan in 1997, but otherwise work with the 30 provincial boundaries in place in 1996.
40Table ifi and Figure V: The annual data come from the 1988-1992 and 1994 issues of
China Price Statistics Yearbook (the publication does not appear to have been produced in 1993),
while the monthly data come from the 4/90 through 6/99 issues of China Price (magazine). Each
issue of the Price Statistics Yearbook provides data on the current and previous year, so the data
overlap from publication year to publication year. Since many locales frequently go unreported,
but these vary from year to year, I construct the largest possible data set by taking the union of
the overlapping yearbooks, treating the most recent publication as more accurate in cases where
the two publications provide inconsistent data on the same locale. The precise grade of product
reported for each locale (e.g. first grade soya beans or second grade soya beans) varies from year
to year. However, it also varies, substantially, across locales within years. Consequently,
combining years does not substantially increase this source of variationt For the retail price
data, the first (1988) Price Statistics Yearbook provides data on average prices in state commer-
cial establishments and, in some cases, average prices in all commercial establishments. I use
the data on all commercial establishments whenever these are available. Excluding the data on
state commercial establishments from the sample only strengthens the results (i.e. the positive
trend in retail prices is greater). Although it is not specified, the data in later issues of the Year-
book, based upon a comparison with the data in the 1988 volume, appear to cover all commercial
establishments.
Regarding the monthly data, the data for 6/96 are an exact duplicate of the data for 5/96, so
I exclude them from the sample. Part of the printed data for 1/93 and 2/93 are hopelessly
jumbled, and these also are excluded from the sample. The monthly data were actually collected
every ten days, but China Price magazine reports only one date within the month (I have been
unable to get the other price reports). For the period 3/90 to 11/92 the data are for the 5th of the
month, for the period 12/92 to 10/93 they cover the 15th of the month, while for the period 10/93
to 5/99 they correspond to the 25th of the month. So 11/25/93 is unreported, while I have two
dates in 10/93, for which I insert separate time dummies.
Finally, I should note that I eliminate all products with less than 5 price observations from
the sample, to avoid having the results driven by standard deviations calculated off of tiny sam-
ples. I also eliminate the annual data on People's Daily newspaper and Mass Movies magazine
as the reported prices of these, with a few rare exceptions, are identical everywhere.
Table IV: The Chinese GDP data are the same as those used in Table H, i.e. are drawn
from the provincial yearbooks. The Chinese employment data are compiled from the provincial
yearbooks, A Comnilation of Historical Statistics (State Statistical Bureau 1990) and Hsueh, Li
and Liu [1993]. I take the provincial yearbooks as more accurate where these disagree with the
other two sources. I should note that the provincial employment numbers differ, slightly, from
those published in national sources such as the China Statistical Yearbook. Similarly, the pro-
vincial numbers are slightly different than the total of the sub-provincial estimates (also reported
in the provincial yearbooks). Usually, higher level Chinese data are simply the sum total of
lower level estimates. This is not the case for employment data, where each level uses its own
surveys and estimation procedures. The differences, however, are quite small.
The United States data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis' disk "Gross State
Product by Industry 1977-1994" and CD-Rom "State Personal Income 1969-95".
44. I have tried, however, to identify substantial changes in the universe of products cov-
ered and, when these occur, use them to define new product types. Thus, for example, in the
monthly data there is a shift from reporting the prices of ordinary flour to those of enriched flour.
In the annual data these are considered substantially different products (i.e. are reported sepa-
rately), and I treat them as such in the analysis of the monthly data.
41Table V and Figures VI and VII: The primary employment data are the same as those used
in Table IV. Data from the China Statistical Yearbook on monthly rainfall in a major city in
each province are used to calculate the mean monthly 'provincial rainfall and its coefficient of
variation (although a few extra cities appear in the Yearbook over time, the historical issues of
the Yearbook only present data on rainfall in one city in each province, so the choice of city is
not an issue). All of the remaining data are compiled from the China Statistical Yearbook, A
Comnilationof Historical Statistics (State Statistical Bureau 1990) and Hsueh, Li and Liu
[1993]. As the Yearbook data for the mid-1980s do not separate Hainan from Guangdong or
Chongqing from Sichuan, in the analysis I use the 29 provincial definitions in place in 1985,
adding Hainan to Guangdong and Chongqing to Sichuan as necessary to generate a consistent
series.
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45TABLET
Distribution of Government Budgetary Revenue by Sector (shares)
Jndustry AgricultureCommerceTransportationConstruction Other
1952 0.36 0.21 0.24 0.05 0.00 0.13
1965 0.73 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.04
1978 0.75 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.03
1995 0.44 0.06 0.33 0.04 0.02 0.12
Industry includes mining, manufacturing and utilities. Revenue is classified according to the
nature of the institution, not the type of revenue, e.g. 'industry' includes non-industrial revenue collected
by industrial ministries.Deviations from provincial
average structure:
TABLE II












6.912.943.97 7.003.733.27 1.000.530.47 1.040.680.37
5.232.282.94 4.682.781.90 0.520.250.27 0.360.220.14








Weighted Unweighted Weighted I T C I TC II C
Squared
19787.152.954.19 6.883.423.46 1.050.510.54 0.980.560.42
19975.371.963.41 4.061.992.07 0.570.230.34 0.300.140.17
78/97 0.750.660.81 0.590.580.60 0.550.450.64 0.310.240.39
T =total,C =coastal,I =interior.TABLE III








Geographic unit city province city city
Frequency annual annual monthly monthly
#of Products 305 130 49 33
#ofTimePeriods 8 8 110 71
# Prod. x Time Combinations 1774 690 3853 1971
#of Price Reports* 48717 10361 79824 46135
(*)Product x time period combinations and number of city/provincial price observa-
tions used in the analysis (products with less than 5priceobservations in a time period
eliminated from the sample).TABLE IV






1978 0.71 0.12 0.56 0.01
1997 0.53 0.15 0.73 -0.17
United States (50 states & D.C.)
1977 1.18 0.31 0.63 0.12
1994 0.72 0.32 0.37 0.01
China (14 provinces#)
1952 1.54 0.44 0.85 0.13
1965 0.98 0.16 0.64 0.09
1978 0.72 0.16 0.63 -0.04
1997 0.58 0.20 0.68 -0.15
(*) All, but Tianjin & Zhejiang. (#) Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang,
Shanghai, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Guangdong, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Qinghai and Ning-
xia.TABLE V
Productivity,Factor Allocations and the Weather














Year .009** .019 .091' .049 .006 -.004 .027 .026

















Wtime .233**.549 .194**-. 155-.080 -.426 .260**
(4.8) (9.4) (3.8) (4.4) (6.4) (8.5) (5.6)
.942 .958 .954 .970 .975 .984 .922 .944
Without Provincial Dummies:
Year .019 .091**.050' .006 -.004 .027**
(1.8) (10.7) (4.0) (0.7) (1.0) (3.3)
Weather -.540 12.4**-3.27 7•34** .790 2.24
(0.3) (9.6) (1.8) (5.3) (1.2) (1.8)
Wtime -.233-.549-.198 -.155 -.080 .426*
(1.0) (3.0) (0.8) (0.8) (0.9) (2.5)
.027 .522 .136 .171 .029 .031
N 374 377 377 376 377 - 377 377 376
Notes: Yield =ln(grainoutput/grain sown area); Irri =ln(irrigatedarea/total sown area); Fert =ln(chemicai
fertilizers/total sown area); Power =ln(totalpower of agricultural machinery (kw)/total sown area); Labour =
ln(employmentin primary industry/total sown area); Prec =averagemonthly rainfall (cm); Prec2 =Precsquared; CVPrec =coefficientof variation of monthly rainfall; Lshare =primaryemployment/total employment; OutputC =
ln(grainoutput per capita); Weather =meanvalue of weather variables multiplied by coefficients in column (1);
Wtime =Weather*(year-1985);(*) Significant at the 10% level; (**) Significant at the 1% level. T-statistics in
parentheses. The sample size increases slightly between column (I) and columns (2)-(8) as, using the mean value of






0 II II II III I I I IFigure II: Convergence in the Composition of Output
(deviation from average production structure in current prices)






National Income Measure (28 provinces)
GOP Measure (30 provinces)
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(b) Sum of Squared Deviations
Note: National Income divided into five sectors: agriculture, industry (mining, manufacturing and utilities), construction, transport and commerce (wholesale
and retail trade and catering). GOP divided nto three sectors: primary (agriculture), secondary (mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities) and
tertiary (services).
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197819811984 1987 1990 1993 1996Figure V: Trends in the Standard Deviation of In Product Prices

















(c) Industrial Materials Prices
(b) Agricultural Purchase Prices
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(27 provinces)
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